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    My main purpose today is to connect the issue of property rights to the set of 
questions concerning economic growth and the long-term determinants of the 
improvements in material well-being. To anticipate what will be my main conclusion, 
it is that property rights and economic growth are not separable. But that statement, 
by itself, is not very interesting. What is important is not my eventual conclusion but 
how I come to arrive at that conclusion. And I should warn you in advance that I will 
arrive at that conclusion via an unconventional pathway, and that our guide along 
that pathway - at least our initial guide - will be Karl Marx. 
 
   Shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s, I wrote 
an article for the Scientific American about the connection - or rather about the lack 
of connection - between Marx’s writings and the collapse of the Soviet Union. My 
main point was that, in Marx’s view, true socialism could arise as a viable form of 
economic organization only after capitalism had worked its unique magic; only after 
capitalism had   created a highly productive society that only capitalist institutions 
and incentives were capable of providing. I received a flood of mail - much of which I 
can only call “crank mail” - from people who were quite insistent that Marx was all 
wrong. It turned out that someone in the editorial office of Scientific American had 
given my article the title “Marx Wasn’t All Wrong,” which was very much in the spirit 
of what I had written. But, for many readers, even that seemingly innocuous  title was 
too much of a concession. Marx had to be all wrong.  Let me simply say that it is 
most unlikely for a person who has written so many thousands of pages, as Marx 
had, to be all wrong.  He was, in fact, right about some quite important matters. 
 
   Writing in the middle of the 19th century and looking back, as a historian, upon the 
immense improvements in human productivity that were the central achievement of 
the industrial revolution, Marx emphasized one central point: His point was not that 
those achievements were due to human ingenuity, or to the earlier scientific 
revolution, or to a work ethic that was inspired by the Protestant Reformation. No. 
His main point was that this outburst of human ingenuity and creativity was the work 
of the capitalist, or rather, to use his term, the bourgeoisie. This is certainly his 
central point in the opening half dozen pages of the Communist Manifesto. (1848). In 
a word, the historic accomplishments of capitalism were due to its unique ability to 
generate technical change. Capitalist societies, unlike all earlier societies, provide 
powerful incentives for the generation and the utilization of new technologies: 
 
“The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of 
production...Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form was, on 
the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes...”  
“The bourgeoisie has...been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It 
has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, 
and Gothic cathedrals...” 
 
   In an even more extravagant later passage, Marx and Engels assert: “The 
bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more colossal 
productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of 
Nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and 
agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole 
continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the 
ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces 
slumbered in the lap of social labor?” I should state that I am in full agreement with 
each of the quotations from Marx that I have just cited. Marx wasn’t all wrong. 
    
   As I see it, however, Marx overlooked 2 very important points: 
 
1. That the act of introducing a drastically new technology, which has been the 
primary source of long-term economic improvements, is full of uncertainties, 
uncertainties that render investment in new technologies a highly risky financial 
undertaking. 
 
2. That the success of capitalism was primarily due to legal, institutional and 
regulatory changes that, in many instances, amounted to significant redefinitions of 
the rights attached to property. Indeed, I would argue that these redefinitions 
amounted, in many cases, to legal and institutional innovations of tremendous social 
significance. The cumulative effect of such innovations has been to reduce the 
intolerable financial risks that had been associated with the introduction of new 
technologies. As a consequence, such risks were by no means eliminated, but they 
were reduced to more acceptable levels. I don’t know, for example, if there were 
debtors’ prisons in Sweden in the 18th century, but I can assure you that such 
prisons existed in England at that time. Adam Smith expressed well the 
contemporary British view in his Wealth of Nations, published in 1776: “Bankruptcy is 
perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befal an innocent 
man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to avoid it. Some, 
indeed, do not avoid it; as some do not avoid the gallows.” 
 
    I would like, then, to focus first on the high risks of innovation. One of the central 
reasons that we do not fully appreciate the risk of failure in technological innovation 
is that the history books dwell upon the success stories, not the failures. Success 
stories, after all, are so much more interesting, and we hope that they serve as 
sources of inspiration to the young. The success stories  have, in a sense, happy 
endings, and they are full of consequences for the future in a way that is not true of 
failures. The result is that the history of industrialization is typically told in terms of a 
series of success stories. In Anglo-American school textbooks we find something like 
this: In the beginning was James Watt (or, just possibly, Thomas Newcomen), Henry 
Cort, Josiah Wedgwood, Richard Arkwright, Eli Whitney, Robert Fulton, Thomas 
Edison, The Wright Brothers, etc. There is some analogy here with military history 
where, as it has been said, history is written by the victors, not by the vanquished. 
 
   But in spite of the neglect of failures in our history books, when one digs a bit 
deeper one finds that the risks of business failure were immense. A doctoral 
dissertation at LSE some years ago, drawing upon court records, found that there 
were no less than 33,000 business failures leading to bankruptcies in England in the 
course of the eighteenth century. This huge number, in what was still a small 
country, included business failures of all kinds, not only those specifically connected 
with new technologies. But of particular interest from my present perspective is the 
fact that the frequency of business failures experienced a sharp acceleration after 
1750, coinciding exactly with the rise in technological innovation that we later came 
to call the industrial revolution. Post-1750 is also precisely the period that Marx had 
in mind when he wrote, in 1848, that “The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one 
hundred years, has created more colossal productive forces than have all previous 
generations  together...” Here again, Marx was right, although in 1848 he  
failed to call attention to the very high incidence of commercial failures connected 
with technological change; at least he failed to do so in the Communist Manifesto 
and in his enormously influential first volume of Das Kapital (1867).  
 
    Yet it is of considerable interest to note that Marx himself did eventually recognize 
this uncertainty, although the recognition only made a much-belated, and obscure, 
public appearance in the third volume of Capital, published after his death, and many 
years after the publication of volume I. In the third volume Marx called attention to 
“the far greater cost of operating an establishment based on a new invention as 
compared to later establishments arising ex suis ossibus. This is so very true that 
trail-blazers generally go bankrupt, and only those who later buy the buildings, 
machinery, etc., at a cheaper price make money out of it.” This is a most interesting 
passage, since it constitutes explicit recognition on Marx’s part of the extreme vulnerability of the capitalist in his social role as a carrier of technical change (“trail-
blazers generally go bankrupt.”). Had Marx given more attention to this vulnerability 
in volume I of Capital, it would have been necessary to portray the capitalist in a 
distinctly different light. Indeed, it would have been necessary to write an altogether 
different book. This observation would have highlighted the weakness of capitalists, 
whereas Marx was intent, in volume I, on portraying their social power and their 
consequent capacity for exploiting others. 
 
                                                  II 
 
   Suppose we now focus on financial risk in the contemporary context, where much 
of the scientific and engineering research of OECD member countries has been 
institutionalized in large industrial firms, and labelled Research and Development 
(R&D). In the US today there are reported to be more than 16,000 industrial 
laboratories, and it is also reported that more than 20 of these firms have R&D 
budgets of more than $1 billion per year. The top 20 US industrial firms, when these 
firms are ranked by R&D spending, spent a total of $54 billion on R&D [in the year 
2000].  Surely it is reasonable to assume, as some have argued, that these powerful, 
affluent organizations have largely or completely eliminated financial risk. Such an 
assumption would, of course, be very far from reality. Huge financial risk continues to 
come from many possible sources: What are these sources? 
 
1. Expenditures on research may simply fail to discover new scientific knowledge of 
any potential usefulness whatever. 
 
2. Even if new scientific knowledge does emerge from research at the scientific 
frontier, it may never lead to a new marketable product. Or, it may require such a 
long period of expenditures on new product design or development that business 
decisionmakers may conclude that the new product is simply too costly.  
 
   But even if research does eventually lead to a new, valuable product concept, 
many further questions remain to be addressed: 
 
3. How well will the new product perform technologically? Will its high performance 
be possible only at a prohibitively high cost?  The Concorde airplane was a 
magnificent achievement in terms of engineering design and speed, but it was also 
an unqualified financial disaster (It was a financial disaster that was mainly financed, 
in this case, by the taxpayers of Britain and France).  
 4. How rapidly will performance improve and how rapidly is the cost of production 
likely to decline? 
 
5.  How attractive will the new product be to the consuming public? How elastic (or 
inelastic) is the demand for the product likely to be, and at what price ought it be 
introduced into the market place? 
 
6. How appropriable is the product for the innovating firm? By “appropriable” I mean, 
how great is the likelihood that the innovating firm will be able to capture any profits 
that might be generated by its innovation? This may depend on whether the 
innovation is patentable. If not patentable, how soon is it likely to be imitated by 
competing firms that spent none of their own money in inventing the product? [This is 
the “free rider problem”]. 
 
7. It is  possible that a government regulatory agency, or a court decision, may 
destroy expected profits through regulatory requirements or a judicial ruling, given 
the extensive concerns over pollution of the environment, occupational safety or 
health? Health considerations  have long been a major concern  in the 
pharmaceutical industry. The US Food and Drug Administration requires that new 
pharmaceutical products go through a protracted period of testing before they may 
be sold to the public. Many new pharmaceutical products must be tested for several 
years before they can be marketed - in some cases the testing period may be more 
than a decade (as in the cases of vaccines or new contraceptive technologies). 
Estimates of the cost of bringing a wholly new pharmaceutical product to market in 
the US now routinely exceed the $500  million mark. Additionally, you are 
presumably all familiar with ABB’s financial collapse due to its earlier acquisition of 
Combustion Engineering. It turned out that ABB eventually “inherited” (if that is the 
right word) the huge liabilities of this subsidiary. These liabilities resulted from a court 
decision, in a gigantic class action suit, involving the potential  damage to human 
health of Combustion Engineering’s extensive use of asbestos. The class action suit 
has already involved more than 200.000 claimants, with over 100,000 more 
claimants still to be dealt with (Only in America!).  
 
8. How soon will a new and superior product come along, either from a competitor or 
from some totally new technology?  It is no paradox to say that one of the greatest 
uncertainties confronting new technologies is the invention of still newer 
technologies.  
    For these, and other reasons, the central issue in the innovation process remains 
having to make major financial commitments in the face of numerous uncertainties. 
From the point of view of the potential entrepreneur, then, innovative activity 
continues to involve the assumption of large financial risks. Indeed, the size of these 
risks may well be growing in the contemporary world. 
 
   Much of what I have said so far has touched upon risks that are connected to the 
inability to forecast the possible outcomes of R&D projects. I believe that a large 
dose of humility is appropriate in this realm because, even when these research 
projects prove to be successful, it can be enormously difficult, especially in affluent 
societies, to forecast consumer reaction to the new product,  and how it will fit in with 
consumer preferences and priorities. Consider the following episode: In 1939 the 
New York Times, the staff of which has certainly  consisted of reasonably intelligent 
and perceptive people, reported on the success of recent experiments that clearly 
foretold the arrival of a potentially fascinating new product: television. But the New 
York Times’ staff did not believe that television had much of a future - at least not in 
the US. Rather, this most prominent and reliable of all American newspapers 
solemnly intoned: “Television will never be a serious competitor for radio, because 
people must sit and keep their eyes glued on a screen; the average American family 
hasn’t time for it.” I am inclined to say that no further comment on that particular 
forecast seems necessary, except to add that a great many American families seem 
- sadly - to have little time for anything else. How can you explain what seems so 
painfully obvious to us in retrospect: the total failure to anticipate that TV was to 
become the most widely-used and influential consumer good of the twentieth 
century? Frankly, I don’t know how to answer that question, and I only want to add 
that there have been many similar experiences of failure to forecast the large future 
impact of some recent invention - in this case, to underestimate demand rather than 
to underestimate costs or the postponement of revenue flows.  
 
   Consider a more recent innovation: the mobile phone, a product in which Sweden 
has played a large, pioneering role. In 1983, when AT&T was in the process of being 
divested, it was considering the possibility of entering into the production and sale of 
this new form of telephony. AT&T hired one of America’s best-known consulting 
firms to forecast how many American subscribers for mobile phones there would be 
likely to be by the year 1999. The forecast that was given to AT&T was that there 
might be as many as one million subscribers to such phones in 1999. In fact, the 
number of subscribers passed the 70 million mark in that year! [See Jerry 
Hausman, “The Cellular Telephone, New Products and the CPI,” NBER Working 
Paper 5982. For an extensive treatment of the Swedish experience, which includes some parallel experiences, see Sven Lindmark, “Evolution of Techno-Economic 
Systems - An Investigation of the History of Mobile Communications,” doctoral 
dissertation, Chalmers University, Goteborg, 2002].  
 
   How can you account for what now appears to have been an absurd 
underestimate? Partly, of course, there was a failure to appreciate the large number 
of ways in which such phones would be useful. But the underestimate was also 
caused by neglect of another consideration that is widespread in anticipating the 
future demand for innovations. The fact is that most new innovations enter the world 
in very primitive conditions, and go through a long process of technical improvement 
and cost reduction before they become marketable on a large scale. The airplane 
first left the ground in 1903 but was not a major commercial product until the late 
1930s. It required fully one-third of a century because many thousands of design 
improvements were necessary before airplanes became sufficiently safe, reliable, 
comfortable and cheap to become widely used by the general public. 
 
   The situation with respect to the mobile phone of 1983 was also quite similar. 
Those phones were primitive. They were so heavy and bulky that they hardly 
deserved to have been called “mobile.” Indeed, the very first mobile phones were 
installed in vehicles. The quality of voice transmission was extremely poor. And, 
most important, the original mobile phones of 1983 sold for more than $3000 in the 
U.S. This compares with much less than $100 in the US today. Indeed, in some 
cases today the phone is given away free of charge, but the recipient of such a 
phone would be well advised to read the fine print in the subscribership contract very 
carefully. (At least in America). 
      
   Even when future demand is drastically underestimated, as in the cases of TV and 
mobile phones, the costs incurred in the R&D that is eventually required to prepare 
the new product for market are likely to be highly uncertain, and also very great. This 
throws us back to the considerations just enumerated. I.e., we do not get away from 
high uncertainty.  
 
   But the uncertainties to which I have been calling your attention, in the instances of 
TV and the mobile phone, are both cases where the technological innovations 
already existed, albeit in rather primitive forms. In such cases, at least, the general 
direction or trajectory of future R&D is reasonably well defined. When we consider 
expenditures on fundamental scientific research, the uncertainties are immeasurably 
greater, because basic research is usually understood to mean thatit is undertaken 
with no particular useful goal in mind. Consider the discovery of the laser, for which 3 scientists, 2 Russians and an American, shared a Nobel prize in 1964, although 
Einstein had already predicted the phenomenon, on purely theoretical grounds, as 
long ago as 1917.  The laser has exercised a direct impact on an enormous range of 
activities and products. Consider: 
 
1. The laser has become a primary instrument of scientific and engineering research 
due to its ability to perform operations and measurements with a degree of precision 
that was previously impossible. Lasers are now being used to probe, to measure and 
to modify the fundamental properties of matter in the realms of chemistry, biology 
and physics. Aeronautical engineers now use laser beams to measure such things 
as local flow velocity and turbulence in the design of aircraft during experimentation 
with new designs in wind tunnels. Several Nobel prizes in science have already been 
won for basic research that made extensive use of lasers.  
 
2. In addition to their role in medical research, lasers have become the instrument of 
choice in a range of surgical procedures. These include a wide variety of extremely 
delicate operations upon the eye, such as the repair of detached retinas, which can 
cause blindness, and reshaping of the cornea in order to correct nearsightedness. 
My ophthalmology clinic in Palo Alto now has a separate section called the “Laser 
Center.” In gynecological surgery, lasers now provide a simpler and less painful 
method for removal of certain tumors. Lasers are presently being tested for the 
treatment of enlarged prostate glands. The US Food and Drug Administration has 
recently approved the use of a laser treatment for back pain. Lasers have also 
received FDA approval for the removal of unwanted body hair and, much more 
important, as a substitute for the dentist’s drill. An impressive index of the impact of 
the laser in medicine is that there are now five journals in the US, established since 
1980, that are devoted exclusively to the application of lasers in medicine. 
 
3. The laser has become a multipurpose tool in industry.  In textiles it is used to cut 
cloth to desired shapes, and it is employed for similar uses across many 
metallurgical sectors, as well as for cutting complex patterns in such materials as 
plywood, glass and plastics.  The Gillette Corporation advertises that their razor 
blades are now welded by laser. In food processing, lasers are being used, so far 
only experimentally, to identify contaminated meat. 
 
4. The most successful computer printers are now based upon laser technology. The 
manuscript on which this talk was prepared is the product of a Hewlett-Packard laser-jet printer. Lasers are also now widely used in the related 
activities of typesetting, newspaper plate making and the printing industry more 
generally. 
 
5. Lasers are now the basic technology inside the bar code scanners at checkout 
counters in supermarkets, as well as in libraries, in inventory control technologies, 
and in security devices in department stores. 
 
6. Lasers are now the technology of choice for the high quality reproduction of music 
in compact discs. 
 
7. The military applications of the laser are fast multiplying. They are 
being used as triggers for nuclear bombs, and also for directing the so-called “smart 
bombs” and missiles to their targets. Lasers have also been widely touted as the key 
to the development of anti-missile devices, although there continues to be much 
disagreement on the potential effectiveness of this application. The Lawrence 
Livermore weapons laboratory in California recently reported that it had created a 
portable laser that can eliminate graffiti from walls at “lightning speed.” A cynical 
interpretation is that this is part of a move to protect their huge research budget by 
showing that their laser technology can also be applied to nonmilitary uses. 
Nevertheless, a device that could readily remove graffiti would be enthusiastically 
welcomed in many of the world’s large cities.  
 
   With respect to this extraordinary diversity of applications, let me suggest a simple 
thought experiment. Go back in your own minds to the early 1960s, after laser action 
had already been achieved, and ask yourself the following question: Which of the 
eventual uses of the laser that I have just enumerated do you think you would have 
forecast if you had been around at that time? And notice that I have not even 
mentioned the much more complicated case of telecommunications, where the use 
of the laser required the simultaneous development of another truly major 
complementary invention: optical fibers. The telecommunications revolution of recent 
years has been largely the product of the combination of these two inventions.  
 
   I would like to be the first to admit that I would not have forecast any of the 
applications that I have just mentioned. After all, what is a laser?  A laser is basically 
no more than a special kind of light beam - a coherent light beam formed by the way 
atoms behave when they are subjected to certain high energy levels. But it is far 
from obvious that the deepest understanding of the pure science underlying the laser 
would lead anyone directly to the very different kinds of functions that are now routinely performed by lasers.  I should  point out that some of the most capable 
patent lawyers in America also failed completely to anticipate the most commercially 
important impact of the laser - its impact upon the global telecommunication system. 
In the words of Charles Townes, who subsequently shared a Nobel Prize for his 
research on the laser: “Bell’s patent department at first refused to patent our 
amplifier or oscillator for optical frequencies because, it was explained, optical waves 
had never been of any importance to communications and hence the invention had 
little bearing on the Bell System interests.”  
 
                                                   III 
  
   Now, in view of the often horrendous difficulties that are inevitably encountered in 
attempting to forecast where new technologies may be going, why would any 
sensible person, or any profit-making firm, ever be willing to commit sizeable 
financial resources to such obviously high-risk enterprises? An adequate answer to 
this question would involve an examination of at least four centuries of legal and 
institutional changes in capitalist societies in western Europe and North America 
[See Rosenberg and Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich].  I offer a two-pronged 
answer. 
 
   The first part of the answer is, in a sense, simple and straightforward. Capitalism is 
a form of economic organization that holds out the possibility of huge financial 
rewards to entrepreneurs who succeed. The second part of the answer is more 
complicated, but it reduces to something I have already been hinting at: western 
societies have introduced a number of political and legal innovations that have had 
the effect of substantially reducing certain kinds of uncertainties, or at least reducing 
the financial  consequences of failure to much more tolerable dimensions. 
 
   In western Europe, after about 1600, a major source of uncertainty reduction came 
from changes in the political system. These changes had the effect of limiting the 
ability of rulers - kings or emperors, or their agents - from exercising their absolute 
political power in arbitrary, unpredictable ways. Some of this came earliest in 
England in the seventeenth century, with the introduction of an elected parliament in 
which property owners were represented and which eventually came to control the 
financial pursestrings of the nation. This meant that neither the king nor his agents 
could confiscate property or impose higher taxes at will. The nation’s budget came to 
be determined by taxes that were set by an elected parliament (Of course the voters 
were, at that time, exclusively property owners). Thus the taxes to be paid by 
business firms in the future were much more predictable, and business firms could therefore make investments in innovation in full knowledge of what their tax liabilities 
would be - at least for some distance into the future. Taxes, then, became calculable 
- predictable - and therefore less subject to the uncertainty of unanticipated changes. 
[Chancellor Schroder]. 
 
   To be predictable meant that someone who was familiar with the law, and legal 
precedents, could reasonably make plans about the investment of his capital without 
having to worry that some politically powerful person could, at some later stage, 
arbitrarily interfere with those plans and perhaps ruin them. Along with this was the 
establishment of commercial law courts for the enforcement of property rights and 
contractual agreements. These innovations in politics and law came to be referred to 
as providing “a government of laws and not of men.” They were of fundamental 
importance in societies that were making technological innovations that would often 
involve large financial commitments extending far into the future. 
 
   Within this larger framework, a number of other legal and organizational 
innovations were gradually introduced.  These had the common effect of reducing 
the extent of the financial risks to which potential innovators would be exposed in 
market-oriented societies. Central, of course, was the legal concept of limited 
liability. The owners of shares of stock in the limited liability corporation could lose 
the entire value of that stock if the firm should accumulate huge debts that it was 
incapable of repaying,, but the owner of the shares of stock could not lose other 
assets  Closely connected was the emergence of stock markets in which the owners 
of shares of corporate stock could quickly, and easily, dispose of these assets if they 
came to expect that the future of the business was likely to involve greater financial 
risks and/or lower prospective financial payoffs than was previously anticipated. 
 
     Perhaps the oldest significant commercial form of risk reduction was the role 
played by insurance companies. The earliest activities of insurance companies, 
especially in the form of maritime insurance, date back centuries before the rise of 
capitalist economies, but capitalism vastly increased the scale and the extent of 
specialized services provided  
bys these institutions. 
 
   Later on, in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, futures markets 
were developed that would enable a business firm to fix a price today for the delivery 
of some asset (wheat, foreign exchange) at some specified time in the future. 
Futures markets thus enabled the firm to avoid the uncertainty of large future price 
increases that might endanger its financial future. Here again, although a certain risk was avoided, the commitment also involved the “risk” that the firm would lose the 
opportunity to purchase the asset at a lower price in the event of an intervening fall in 
the price of that asset.  
 
 
    There have been various attempts on the part of policy makers to minimize the 
downside risks of corporate failures. In the US this took the form of the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978. Chapter 11 of this Act included provisions that would reduce the cost of 
failures by rendering the consequences of bankruptcy less punitive and by making it 
easier for a firm to undertake reorganization, after filing for bankruptcy, rather than 
going directly into liquidation. 
  
   It is difficult to evaluate the success of this option, especially since it often involves 
retention of the same management that made the decisions leading to bankruptcy in 
the first place. In many cases there is at least a presumption that such management 
were poor decisionmakers,  and allowing them to remain in place may provide such 
management with opportunities to further “strip” the firm of valuable remaining 
assets. The alternative, in many other countries, has often turned out to involve 
keeping the failed firm alive with substantial government subsidies. A better market-
based alternative would involve reorganization with new leadership, along with new 
private investors who might be prepared to risk their own “new money” to rehabilitate 
a bankrupted company. Not surprisingly, such investors often fail to present 
themselves.               
     
    The most widely-used approach to  risk reduction, employed at many levels and in 
many places, is the diversification of assets. Individuals and organizations may 
reduce their exposure to financial risk by diversifying the assets that they choose to 
buy and to hold in their investment portfolios, rather than owning, say, shares of 
stock in only a small number, or even a single firm. Mutual funds will happily make 
diversification selections for an individual investor - for a certain fee, of course.  
Maximizing the returns from an investment portfolio is an extremely complex and 
subtle analytical exercise, in view of the fact that higher expected financial returns 
typically involve taking greater risks. So subtle, in fact, that a Stanford University 
professor shared a Nobel Prize in economics in 1990 for developing a rigorous 
analytical method that distinguished between diversifiable and nondiversifiable risks. 
Appropriately enough, the professor’s name is “Sharpe.” [William F. Sharpe. Prize 
shared with Merton Miller and Harry Markowitz]. 
    The same basic principle of  risk reduction through portfolio diversification 
underlies one the most significant institutional innovations in recent decades: the 
venture capital industry. The great contribution of the venture capital industry was to 
become a source of capital to young, high-risk, high tech firms that were unable to 
borrow from banks because of insufficient collateral. In the US, where the venture 
capital industry has been most influential, the private venture capital industry 
emerged around 1980. This emergence was primarily the result of regulatory and 
legislative changes that, again, converted high risk but also high tech opportunities to 
more acceptable risk levels. This was achieved through portfolio diversification on 
the part of the venture capital firm and, at the same time, changes in the tax 
structure that offered improved prospective payoffs to successful entrepreneurship. 
The main changes were (1) reductions in the capital gains tax, (2) the deferral of tax 
liabilities for holders of stock options until the time when the stocks were sold rather 
than when the options were exercised, and (3) regulatory change (ERISA) that 
allowed pension funds to invest in high risk securities issued by small or new 
companies and venture capital funds. These changes essentially opened up a 
floodgate of investment funds through the 1980s and 1990s, most especially in 
computer hardware and software, medical and biotechnology sectors, 
communications and semiconductors.. 
 
    The amount of venture capital under management in the US rose from around $4 
billion in 1980 to $34 billion in 1990, declined slightly in the early 1990s, but then 
rose more than sixfold, from $35 billion to more than $234 billion, between 1994 and 
2000 [National Science Board, 2002, 6-35]. Most recently, the spectacular growth of 
the Internet (which was followed by an almost equally spectacular fall) depended 
heavily upon venture capital financing. 
 
   American venture capital firms, it should be emphasized, have done a great deal 
more than merely supplying capital to high risk, high tech enterprises. They have in 
fact reshaped the nature of entrepreneurship by providing various kinds of 
sophisticated expertise and decisionmaking abilities that have prepared it for entry 
(and survival) in highly competitive markets. Indeed, in a very serious sense, 
American venture capital firms have been serving, not just as suppliers of risk 
capital, but also as suppliers of entrepreneurial talent.  
 
                                                    IV 
 
      Thus, in a variety of ways, the history of western capitalism has involved the 
gradual introduction of a large number of legal and institutional innovations that had the effect of expanding the commitment of resources to the pursuit of technological 
change. It achieved this by reducing, or limiting, the extent of financial risks 
associated with technological innovation.  Risk reduction also meant an increase in 
the willingness to experiment, using this term in the broadest sense. Experimentation 
has taken place, not only with respect to new technologies, but with respect to new 
forms of business organization, of which the venture capital industry is an excellent 
example. A main virtue of western capitalism is that it has encouraged a search for 
new technologies on a decentralized basis, and with multiple sources of 
decisionmaking and risktaking, through anti-monopoly legislation.  
 
     As it happens, some of the most distinctive virtues of the capitalist form of 
organization have become apparent only as a result of examining the pathology of 
socialist societies that emerged in the course of the twentieth century. Indeed, one 
might say that the largest, unintentional experiment of the twentieth century was  the 
experiments with organization, and associated incentives, that were undertaken 
under centralized socialism. I use the term “unintentional” because, although 
socialism and communism were identified as ultimate goals by large, powerful, 
political movements, the manner in which such societies would organize their 
economic activities had never been systematically thought through before the 
Bolshevik Revolution - certainly not by Karl Marx. These experiments have revealed, 
not only the defects inherent in the forms of centralised planning that were eventually 
adopted, but also the considerable strengths of market economies that had 
previously been insufficiently appreciated.  
 
    It has turned out, for example, that one reason why socialist societies have been 
so technologically backward is because both their central planners and their plant 
managers have been strongly risk-averse with respect to the introduction of new 
technologies. The Soviet planning system was relentlessly short-term in its outlook. 
Within the rules of the central planning game, plant managers had good reason to be 
risk-averse. But this risk aversion translated into an unwillingness to adopt new 
technologies, because the inevitable disruptiveness of installing new technologies 
would be likely to bring with it a failure to meet annual production quotas. And, for a 
plant manager, failing to fulfill the annual production goal of his plant, as laid down by 
the central planners (Gosplan), was likely to mark the abrupt end of his managerial 
career. But there was also a “Catch 22.” In the event that a new, productivity-
increasing technology did get installed within a firm, the evidence of that expanded 
productive capability would be likely to be translated into a higher output quota for 
the innovating firm in subsequent years. Thus, for the plant manager, there was no 
gain.  
   There was, of course, much more to the story than that. After all, in certain fields, 
the Soviet Union had, without any question, some of the world’s most brilliant 
scientists (“Blackboard sciences”). But the links, in terms of organization and 
incentives, that might connect scientific research with the development of improved 
technologies, and the firms that might eventually introduce those technologies into 
the market place - these were almost totally neglected (except for the military and 
space programs). As both the Russians and Chinese have eventually discovered, it 
is very difficult to make socialist economies more innovative without, at the same 
time, also making them more capitalistic. 
 
   The Soviet planners, in addition, suffered from a form of Gigantomania. Bigger was 
always regarded as better. And yet, in the successful economies of the West, small 
firms, and even single individuals, have always played roles of considerable 
importance in the process of technological innovation, and continue to do so. The 
freedom to experiment with firms of different sizes has been an ongoing 
phenomenon in capitalist economies. The freedom to experiment and to establish 
new firms has been of even greater importance when those freedoms have been 
connected with the enticing possibility of capturing large profits through the 
introduction of new or improved products. Indeed, the inducement effects of such 
prospective profits have been, without question, one of the great engines of 
capitalism’s technological energy and dynamism. In reasonably competitive markets 
it has been true not only to say that innovation is risky, but that the failure to 
innovate, a willingness to remain with an increasingly outmoded technology, may 
turn out to be even more risky. Marx understood this point extremely well, and 
emphasized it quite forcefully.. 
 
   Furthermore, the outcome of decentralized experimentation in capitalist societies, 
and the prospect of large profits, has been a highly diversified set of industrial 
structures. In the US, large firms totally dominate some sectors of the economy, 
firms of medium and small size persist elsewhere, and, still elsewhere, a small 
number of large firms coexist with a large number of small ones (Silicon Valley). 
Countries that have provided an environment of strong financial incentives for 
innovative activity may find that they have acquired certain comparative advantages 
in innovative activities that simply defy explanation in terms of the economist’s 
intellectual toolkit. As Assar Lindbeck once pointed out: “...nobody could possibly 
have predicted, say at the turn of the twentieth century or a few decades later, that 
Sweden would be successful in the production of ballbearings, safety matches, 
cream separators, automatic lighthouses, telephone exchanges and military airplanes - or, for that matter, pyramid-shaped packages for milk and marketing 
systems for furniture produced in Eastern Europe.” 
 
                                                   V 
   
      A great virtue of private property is that private firms, in undertaking research for 
new technologies, are very much aware that they confront huge uncertainties in the 
investment process, uncertainties that, as I have suggested, are generated by a wide 
variety of sources in a market economy. Private firms are also aware that they must 
make their own assessments of possible directions of research, and that they must 
“place their financial bets” accordingly.  Bad bets are, of course, common; indeed, 
they are far more common than good ones. It is therefore tempting to conclude, as 
socialist planners have long concluded, that the manner in which competing firms 
pursue innovation, under the capitalist rules of the game, is a very wasteful process. 
But the notion that central planning and centralization of decision-making are likely to 
be more efficient than the decentralized market, turns out to be precisely the 
opposite of the truth when there is a high degree of uncertainty and when goals and 
objectives cannot be clearly stated ex ante. 
 
   Indeed, a considerable virtue of capitalist institutions is that, in the face of huge ex 
ante uncertainties concerning the possible uses of new technological capabilities, 
market forces provide strong financial incentives to explore along a wide variety of 
alternative paths [I would remind you of some of the eventual applications of the 
laser]. This wide-ranging exploration, by a large number of decentralized 
decisionmakers, is especially desirable in the early stages of research, when 
uncertainties are particularly high and when individuals with differences of opinion 
need to be encouraged to pursue their own hunches or intuitions. 
 
   These differences of opinion are often based on differences in access to 
information, especially on the part of individuals coming from different educational 
backgrounds or from different, earlier industrial experiences. Chemical engineers, for 
example, might be expected to approach the causes of unreliability, in the 
performance of transistors, in a very different way from electrical engineers or solid 
state physicists. Indeed, it is important that the general point should be stated more 
affirmatively: the achievement of technological progress, in the face of numerous 
uncertainties, absolutely requires such differences of opinion, in addition to a 
willingness to commit time, energy, and financial resources to support those 
differences of opinion.  In fact, the freedom to pursue alternative paths of research, 
within a  property rights regime that may provide substantial financial payoffs to successful innovators, has been the driving force underlying the technological 
dynamism of western capitalism.  
 
   As I have argued, capitalist institutions, over the years, have developed a variety of 
ways of reducing the uncertainties, and therefore reducing many of the financial 
risks, that are associated with conducting research for improved technologies. 
However, the end results of that research necessarily remain unpredictable. After 
all, if we could correctly anticipate the eventual findings of a protracted and costly 
research process, then it would no longer be necessary to undertake that research in 
the first place. But that is precisely the point: we cannot so predict. No one in 1961 
could have confidently predicted the wide range of eventual uses of the laser. And, I 
strongly suspect, no one today can predict the specific, future useful applications of 
nanotechnology or stem cell research. These applications cannot be captured 
through purely abstract reasoning or mathematical model building, however 
sophisticated. One simply has to explore the consequences of different trajectories 
of scientific research and technology development.  A society that attaches a high 
value to economic growth needs to have a property rights system that will offer 
substantial financial rewards to those who are prepared to deal with the persisting  
uncertainties that are inherent in the innovation process. 
 
 
 
 
  
 